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Meaning, Intonation and Negation
Marc Swerts and Emiel Krahmer
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Abstract. This paper describes a methodology for the study of meaning and
intonation, focusing both on what speakers can do (using production experiments)
and on what hearers can do (using perception experiments). We show that such an
experimental paradigm may yield interesting results from a semantical point of view
by discussing the role intonation can play in the interpretation of negation phrases
in natural language. We present empirical evidence for the existence of a set of
prosodic differences between two kinds of negation, descriptive and metalinguistic.
This distinction has been the subject of considerable debate in presupposition theory
and also plays an important role in discussions about the division of labor between
semantics and pragmatics. In general, we argue that intonation gives rise to ‘soft
constraints’, and point out that an optimality theoretic framework may be suitable
to model the relation between intonation and meaning. We outline some problems
and prospects for an optimality theoretic account of meaning and intonation.
Keywords: Intonation, negation, production and perception, optimality
1. Introduction
1.1. Meaning, Intonation . . .
In describing the sound shape of a language, it is common practice to
distinguish between a segmental and a suprasegmental (or prosodic)
level. The former refers to the individual speech sounds, seen as the
basic units into which a continuous stream of speech can be subdivided.
The latter comprises vocal features such as speech melody, tempo,
loudness, pause, that are not typical attributes of the single segments,
but are characteristic of longer stretches of speech. There has been a
lot of research on how these two levels of sound structure may affect
the meaning of an utterance. At the segmental level, one can view
the individual speech sounds as the basic building blocks out of which
meaningful units are constructed. Though they have no intrinsic mean-
ing of their own, they may change meaning in a discrete way, as the
replacement of one phoneme by another forms a different word (the
distinctivity principle). Consider the following pair of utterances:
c© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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(1) a. John likes dogs.
b. John likes hogs.
The difference in meaning between these utterances is obvious. There
is a clear-cut segmental contrast between the phonemes /d/ and /h/,
which implies a categorical difference between the words dogs and hogs,
and thus accounts for the difference in (truth-conditional) meaning
between (1.a) and (1.b). A linguistic description of such phonological
contrasts is helped by the existence of a lexicon which provides a yard-
stick to decide whether or not a difference in form leads to a difference
in meaning.
Similar attempts to relate form to meaning at the suprasegmen-
tal level have often been less successful, because prosodic variation is
usually not distinctive in this structural linguistic sense. It is generally
more difficult to paraphrase how the meaning of an utterance is affected
by replacing its intonation contour by another. For instance, consider
the following variants of (1.a). In (2.a), the word dogs is pronounced
with a sharp rise in pitch (an H∗ pitch accent in the terminology of
Pierrehumbert 1980), while in (2.b) it is pronounced with a lower-rising
pitch accent (notated as L+H∗).
(2) a. John likes dogs
H∗
b. John likes dogs
L+H∗
What is the difference in ‘meaning’ between (2.a) and (2.b)? For in-
stance, what is the function of the L+H∗ accent in (2.b)? The literature
contains the following, partially overlapping suggestions. According to
Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg (1990) it marks a contrastive relation be-
tween dogs and something else. Vallduv́ı (1992) claims that it indicates
that the NP dogs is a link (an instruction to update a file card, in
the sense of Heim 1982). According to the theory of Steedman (2000)
it is an indication that dogs is part of the theme (provided that the
entire contour is of the form L+H∗ L− H%), while Hendriks (2002)
would claim that dogs is a non-monotone anaphor. To complicate the
picture even further, it is still a matter of considerable debate whether
a separately identifiable L+H∗-form accent exists.1
This is not an isolated problem. When studying the relation between
meaning and intonation, we have to face basic questions such as: what
are the descriptive intonational units, does the assumed meaning of a
1 Recent work by Herman and McGory (2002) shows that of all the ToBI tones
(Silverman et al., 1992) the H∗ and L+H∗ are conceptually the most similar ones,
and the main cause of disagreements between professional labellers.
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contour generalize to all tokens of that intonation pattern, how should
one account for the variability between speakers in how they supple-
ment their utterances with intonation patterns and for the variability
between listeners in how they interpret particular contours, and how
should one deal with the fact that the linguistic and situational con-
text of an utterance may overrule the meaning of a given intonational
contour.2 Problems such as these made intonologists sceptical about
the prospects of assigning ‘meanings’ (in the broadest sense) to into-
nation contours. Cutler (1977:106): “(. . . ) the attempt to extract from
[intonation contours] an element of commonality valid in all contexts
must be reckoned a futile endeavour”. One of the propositions (no. 9)
of the theory of intonation put forward by ’t Hart et al., (1990:110)
is: “Intonation features have no intrinsic meaning.” One of the key
problems seems to be that prosody often involves gradient rather than
categorical differences, which is a severe complication when one wants
to apply the principle of distinctivity to prosodic features, and assign
semantic properties to these features.
Despite these methodological difficulties, semanticists are increas-
ingly interested in incorporating intonation in semantic theories of
language (e.g., Schwarzschild 1999, Steedman 2002 and Hendriks 2002).
The motivation is that utterances do not occur in an intonational vac-
uum.3 Rather, speakers may use intonation to cue certain aspects of
meaning, and listeners may use these cues during the interpretation
of the speaker’s utterance. The case of negation phrases offers a good
illustration of this.
1.2. . . . and Negation
Negation phrases in natural language are usually represented semanti-
cally by a logical negation. But consider the following examples from
Horn (1985:132), who uses small caps to indicate pitch accents:
(3) a. Some men aren’t chauvinists — all men are chauvinists.
b. I didn’t manage to trap two mongeese — I managed to trap
two mongooses.
The negation phrases in the first part of these utterances do not negate
part of the proposition expressed, but respectively a conversational
2 Moreover, it is worth stressing that prosody may also be ‘meaningful’ in quite
different ways, to signal communicatively relevant phenomena like the cocktail party
phenomenon, turn-taking, emotional and attitudinal aspects of utterances, etc.
3 This is obvious for spoken language, but recent psycholinguistic evidence sug-
gests that people even use intonation when interpreting written language (see e.g.,
Fodor 2002).
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implicature and an instance of inflectional morphology. It is not obvious
how negation should be expressed logically for examples such as these.
According to Horn (1985:125), the classical examples of presupposition
denial are manifestations of the same problem as that exemplified by
(3). Consider the standard example, originally due to Russell (1905).
(4) The present king of France is not bald.
In (4) the negation phrase can either deny the proposition that the
present king of France is bald or the presupposition that a king of
France exists. The difference becomes especially clear when we take a
question-answer perspective.
(5) Q: Is the present king of France bald?
A1: No, he isn’t.
A2: No, the king of France isn’t bald — there isn’t any king
of France.
Horn would call the negation in A1 a descriptive negation and the
one in A2 (like those in (3)) a metalinguistic negation. The problem
is that we have two different uses of negation, which cannot both be
treated in the same logical way.
Various solutions have been proposed. One is to assume that natu-
ral language negation is semantically ambiguous. Russell, for instance,
maintains that (4) is ambiguous between a narrow scope and a wide
scope reading for the negation. Others, following the seminal work of
Frege and Strawson, have argued that presupposition failure leads to
truth-value gaps (propositions being neither true nor false) and that
there should really be two different logical negations (e.g., ¬ for the tra-
ditional negation, and ∼ for the presupposition cancelling negation).4




The main problem for accounts which assume the existence of a se-
mantic ambiguity for negation is that it is difficult to show the actual
4 See Beaver and Krahmer (2001) for an overview. They also present an alterna-
tive to postulating ambiguities for logical connectives, which uses Bochvar’s (1939)
assertion operator A as a presupposition wipe-out device; whatever is presupposed
by a logical formula ϕ, Aϕ presupposes nothing.
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existence of such an ambiguity. For instance, while it is true that there
are many languages in which negation may be ambiguous, this am-
biguity apparently does not involve two negation phrases which can
be represented in the logical form as ¬ and ∼ respectively. This has
led other researches (such as Atlas 1977 and Gazdar 1979) to deny
the existence of an ambiguity for negation. However, this is “wielding
Occam’s razor like a samurai sword” (Horn 1985:126), in that it denies
the existence of the two distinct uses of negation.
According to Horn negation is pragmatically ambiguous. It has a
built-in duality of use; negation may be used in either a descriptive or
a metalinguistic way. The difference in usage can be illustrated best
when the two types of negation are studied in larger interactions: met-
alinguistic negation naturally occurs in response to utterances by other
dialogue partners earlier in the same discourse contexts, announcing
a speaker’s unwillingness to accept another’s assertion of a particular
state of affairs. Thus, following Horn (1985:136), a metalinguistic nega-
tion expresses something like “‘I object to u”, where u is crucially a
linguistic utterance rather than an abstract proposition”.
The problem, then, is how to distinguish the different uses of nega-
tion. Horn mentions two tests. The first is based on the ability of
descriptive (but not metalinguistic) negation to incorporate prefixally.
These examples are from Horn (1985:140):
(6) a. The king of France is {not happy / * unhappy} — there isn’t
any king of France.
b { It isn’t possible / * Its impossible } for you to leave now
— it’s necessary.
The second test (mentioned in an appendix of Horn 1985) is based on
the observation that metalinguistic (but not descriptive) negation can
occur in “not X but Y” contexts. Consider the following example (due
to Fillmore, cited by Horn 1985:170):
(7) John wasn’t born in Boston, but in Philadelphia.
Both tests are not foolproof and have a somewhat limited applicability,
so a more general criterion would be useful. It has been argued that
intonation could be used to distinguish the two uses of negation. Some
claim that the negative sentence in a metalinguistic negation involves
“contrastive intonation with a final rise” (this is what Liberman and
Sag 1974 dubbed the ‘contradiction contour’5) while the continuation
contains a ‘rectification’ which is prosodically marked.
5 Note that Cutler (1977) has argued that this particular contour can also have
very different ‘meanings’.
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The goal of the current study is to find empirical support for the dif-
ference between descriptive and metalinguistic negations. In particular,
we present evidence for the existence of a set of prosodic correlates for
these two different usages. We focus both on what speakers do (using
production data) and on what hearers do (using perception data). The
perception experiment explicitly trades on the assumption that mean-
ing distinctions are only communicatively relevant if they can reliably
and consistently be ‘interpreted’. In the following, we will first give more
information on the data we used and on the way we operationalized
descriptive and metalinguistic negations. Then, we present results of
a speaker-oriented and listener-oriented analysis of the negations. We
end with a general discussion and conclusion.
2. Data and definitions
How do speakers produce metalinguistic negations, and is there a differ-
ence with ‘ordinary’, descriptive negations? To address this question, we
have conducted a corpus study of a set of human-machine interactions
that contains utterances that can be operationalized as instances of
a descriptive or a metalinguistic usage of negation. Our starting as-
sumption is that the discussion about the two types of negation is very
much in line with claims put forward in current models about dialogue
behaviour. One central claim in many of these models is that dialogue
partners are continuously monitoring the flow of the interaction, and
notify each other whenever something is wrong. This is reflected in the
following rule for dialogue behavior from Groenendijk et al., (1996):
Rule H2 If a sentence is uttered which is incompatible with a par-
ticipant’s information state, then she does not update with it, but
signals the incompatibility by uttering a sentence that contradicts
the sentence uttered.
We take it that metalinguistic negations are examples of ‘sentences con-
tradicting the previously uttered sentence’. They function as a negative,
‘go back’ signal, indicating that there is an apparent communication
problem; a discrepancy between the last utterance of the addressee and
the information state of the current speaker. If there are no commu-
nication problems, the speaker sends a positive, ‘go on’ signal. Our
hypothesis is that speakers use more prosodically marked features in
the case of ‘go back’ signals (indicating a communication problem) than
in the case of ‘go on’ signals. The intuition is that it is more important
for an addressee to pick up a ‘go back’ signal than it is to pick up a
‘go on’ signal (see also Clark and Schaeffer 1989). If a ‘go on’ signal is
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missed, this does not hamper the communication; it can continue any-
way. The expectation that go-back signals are provided with prominent
prosodic features is in line with Horn’s claim that metalinguistic forms
of negation are ‘marked’.
To test the hypothesis a corpus of human-machine dialogues was
used.6 This corpus consists of 120 dialogues with two speaker-indepen-
dent Dutch spoken dialogue systems which provide train time table
information (see Weegels 2002). In a series of questions, both systems
prompt the user for unknown slots, such as departure station, arrival
station, date, etc. Twenty subjects were asked to query both systems
via telephone on a number of train journeys. They had to perform three
simple travel queries on each system (in total six tasks). In the corpus
used in this study, subjects may use disconfirmations in response to two
kinds of questions, of which (8.a) and (8.b) are representative examples.
(8) a. So you want to go from Eindhoven to Swalmen?
b. Do you want me to repeat the connection?
Both (8.a) and (8.b) are yes/no questions and to both “no” is a perfectly
natural answer. However, the two questions serve a rather different goal,
and consequently the corresponding negations have a rather different
function. Question (8.a) is an (explicit) attempt of the system to verify
whether its current assumptions (about the departure and arrival sta-
tion) are compatible with the intentions of the subject.7 If this is not
the case, the subject will signal this (in line with rule H2 above) using
a metalinguistic negation, thereby indicating that at least one of the
system’s assumptions is incorrect:
(9) No, not to Swalmen but to Reuver.
(Compare example (7) above.) Question (8.b), on the other hand, is
not an attempt of the system to verify its assumptions, and hence it
cannot represent incorrect system assumptions. A subsequent negative
6 The current discussion of negation is part of a wider research programme to
study communication problems in human-machine conversation (see e.g., Krahmer
et al., 2002). Given the current state of the art in speech technology, spoken commu-
nication with computers is still error-prone. Moreover, computers find it difficult to
monitor the ongoing dialogue. If they would be able to distinguish descriptive nega-
tions (which do not signal communication problems) from metalinguistic negations
(which do), this would be helpful from an error-handling point of view.
7 Due to the imperfections of automatic speech recognition technology, current
state dialogue systems are in constant need of verification.
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answer from a subject thus serves as an ‘ordinary’, descriptive negation.
A typical example would be:8
(10) No, that is not necessary.
So, the two kinds of system yes/no questions allow for an unambiguous
distinction between descriptive and metalinguistic negation. The re-
spective disconfirmations, being lexically similar but functionally differ-
ent, constitute minimal pairs, allowing us to check whether the various
occurrences of this kind of utterance vary prosodically as a function of
their context. In this way, they form ideal, naturally occurring speech
materials for investigating the role of prosody, which can be analysed
both from a speaker and listener perspective, as will be illustrated in
the following sections.
3. Experimental analyses
3.1. Speaker’s Perspective: Production Experiment
3.1.1. Method
To study the speaker’s perspective we randomly selected 109 negative
answers to yes/no questions from the 120 dialogues. If a negative answer
follows a verification question (such as (8.a)), the subject’s utterance
indicates that there are communication problems. This is the case
for 68 of the 109 negative answers (62%). If a negative answer follows
a standard yes/no question (like (8.b)) there are no communication
problems (notated as no problems). These are the remaining 41 cases
(38%).
Regarding their structure, the subjects’ negations were divided into
three categories: (1) responses only consisting of a single explicit discon-
firmation marker “no” (“nee”), (2) responses consisting of an explicit
disconfirmation marker followed by other words (‘no+stuff’ in the ter-
minology of Hockey et al., 1997), (3) responses containing no explicit
disconfirmation marker (‘stuff’).9
8 The original Dutch utterance is Nee, dat is niet nodig , and —significantly— the
negation phrase could also have been incorporated prefixally (Nee, dat is onnodig)
Compare example (6) above.
9 As we shall see, metalinguistic negations may occur which do not contain an
explicit negation. An example would be the second turn in the following exchange:
A: Thomas ate some cookies.
B: He ate all cookies!
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Table I. Numbers of negative answer types fol-
lowing an unproblematic system utterance (no
problems) and following those containing one or
more problems (problems).
Type no problems problems Total
no 18 11 29
stuff 0 24 24
no+stuff 23 33 56
Total 41 68 109
The subjects’ responses to the yes/no questions were analyzed in
terms of the following features: (1) presence or absence of a high bound-
ary tone following “no”; (2) duration (in ms) of “no”; (3) duration (in
ms) of pause after “no” before stuff; (4) duration (in ms) of pause
between system’s prompt and user response; (5) F0 max10 (in Hz) at
energy peak of major pitch accent in stuff; (6) number of words in stuff.
3.1.2. Results
Table I gives the distribution of different types of negation following
either an unproblematic system utterance or one which contains one
or more problems. A χ2 test reveals that these numbers significantly
differ from chance level (p < 0.001). First, this table shows that the
minimal response, a single no, is in the majority of the cases used when
there are no communication problems. Second, single stuff responses are
exclusively reserved for responses following a system utterance with one
or more problems. The majority of the responses to yes/no questions
in our data, however, is of the no+stuff type, which may serve either
as a descriptive or as a metalinguistic negation. The lexical material in
the stuff is quite different for the two signals: for the positive cases, the
subsequent words are mostly some polite phrases (“thank you”, “that’s
right”); for the metalinguistic cases, the stuff usually is an attempt to
correct the information which caused the problems (i.e., what Horn
called the ‘rectification’).
Table II displays the presence or absence of high boundary tones
(H% in the terminology of Pierrehumbert 1980) on the word “no”
(for the single no and no+stuff cases). A χ2 test reveals that this
distribution is again well above chance level (p < 0.001). In the case
of problems, the “no” is generally provided with a question-like H%
10 F0 stands for fundamental frequency ; changes in the fundamental frequency are
the most commonly used approximation of perceived pitch variations.
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Table II. Presence or absence of high boundary tones following
occurrences of “no” (single no and no+stuff, 29 and 56 cases
respectively) for positive and negative cues.
High boundary tone no problems problems Total
Absent 32 7 39
Present 9 37 46
Total 41 44 85
Table III. Average values for various features. Duration of
“no” (for all occurrences of “no”: single no and no+stuff),
delay between end of system utterance and beginning of
user’s disconfirmation (all cases), pause between “no” and
stuff (for no+stuff cases), F0 max in stuff and number of
words in stuff (both for no+stuff and stuff).
Feature no problems problems
Duration of “no” (ms)∗∗ 226 343
Preceding delay (ms)∗∗ 516 953
Following pause (ms)∗ 94 311
F0 max in stuff (Hz)
∗ 175 216
Words in stuff∗∗ 2.61 5.42
∗∗p < 0.001, ∗p < 0.05
boundary tone, which is absent when “no” follows an unproblematic
system utterance.
The results for the continuous prosodic features of interest are given
in Table III. Taking the utterances of all subjects together, a t-test
reveals a significant difference for each of these features. The trend is
the same in all cases: corrective, metalinguistic negations are compar-
atively marked. First, the word “no” —when it occurs— is longer.
Second, there is a longer delay after a problematic system prompt
before subjects respond. Third, in the no+stuff utterances, the interval
between “no” and the remainder of the utterance is longer. Fourth, the
stuff part of the answer usually contains a high-pitched accent to mark
corrected information, whereas in the unproblematic case the stuff is
usually prosodically unmarked. Finally, the stuff part tends to be longer
in number of words. In sum: there are clear prosodic differences between
metalinguistic and descriptive negations.
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3.2. Hearer’s Perspective: Perception Experiment
3.2.1. Method
It seems a reasonable hypothesis that when speakers systematically
dress up their utterances with certain features, hearers will be able to
attach communicative relevance to the presence or absence of these
features. To test if this is indeed the case for the acoustic properties
of utterances of “no” described in Section 3.1, a perception experi-
ment was carried out. For this experiment we used 40 “no”s, all taken
from no+stuff disconfirmations. We opted for no+stuff disconfirma-
tions since these are the most frequent. In addition, they are equally
likely to be used following problematic and unproblematic system ut-
terances from a distributional perspective (see Table I), and are thus
least biased in terms of their function as positive or negative cues. For
the perception study, we only used the “no”-part of these utterances,
given that the stuff-part would be too informative about their function
(compare answers A1 and A2 in (5)). Of the 40 “no”s, 20 functioned
as a descriptive negation and 20 as a metalinguistic negation. Subjects
of the perception experiment were 25 native speakers of Dutch. They
were presented with the 40 stimuli, each time in a different random
order to compensate for any potential learning effects. They heard each
stimulus only once. The experiment was self-paced and no feedback
was given on previous choices. In an individual, forced choice task, the
subjects were instructed to judge for each “no” they heard whether
the speaker signaled a communication problem or not. They were not
given any hints as to what cues they should focus on. The subjects
were first presented with four “exercise” stimuli to make them aware of
the experimental platform and the type of stimuli. It is worth stressing
that the choice to use only “no”s extracted from no+stuff answers
implies that not all the acoustic features which speakers employ (see
above) survive in the current perceptual analysis. In particular, we lose
the features delay (time between end of prompt and start of subject’s
answer), pause (time between end of “no” and beginning of stuff) as
well as any potential cues in the stuff part (e.g., number of words,
narrow-focused pitch accents).
3.2.2. Results
Table IV summarizes the results of the perception experiment. For each
stimulus, a χ2 test was used to check whether there was a significant
preference for perceiving an utterances as signalling no problem or
as signalling a problem. Of the descriptive negations, 17 out of 20
were classified by a significant number of subjects as cases in which
the speaker did not signal a problem. The remaining three cases were
SwertsKrahmerChaptv2.tex; 29/06/2004; 13:03; p.11
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Table IV. Perceived classification of positive and negative signals.
Perceived as No significant Perceived as
no problems difference problems Total
no problems 17 3 0 20
problems 1 4 15 20
Total 18 7 15 40
in the expected direction, though not significant. Of the metalinguistic
negations, 15 out of 20 cases were classified correctly as instances of
“no” signaling problems. Interestingly one metalinguistic negation was
significantly misclassified as a descriptive negation. A post-hoc acoustic
analysis of this “no” revealed that it shared its primary characteris-
tics with ordinary descriptive negations. In particular: the “no” was
relatively short, and lacked a high boundary tone. Table IV clearly
shows that subjects are good at correctly classifying instances of “no”,
extracted from no+stuff utterances, as descriptive or metalinguistic
negations.
4. Discussion: Meaning, Intonation and Optimality
We have studied the differences between two kinds of negation, de-
scriptive and metalinguistic, and did so from two perspectives. The
production perspective showed that there are a number of significant
prosodic differences between the two. Metalinguistic negations tend to
have high boundary tones (in line with Liberman and Sag 1974), the
negation phrase itself is relatively long, is preceded and followed by
longer pauses and the continuation has a relatively high pitch peak.
This pitch peak is placed on the corrected item (the rectification) and
has a narrow focus. A typical example is the following, in which the
speaker indicates she doesn’t want to go to Amsterdam:
(11) No, to Opdam.
It is interesting to observe that the pitch accent occurs on the syllable
‘op-’, while normally it would occur on ‘-dam’.
Descriptive negations, on the other hand, are usually not realized
with a high boundary tone, are preceded and followed by shorter pauses,
and have a relatively flat continuation (in the no+stuff cases). In ad-
dition, it is interesting to observe that a single negation ‘no’ is most
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likely to be descriptive, while single stuff is exclusively associated with
the metalinguistic case. Thus, it appears that speakers produce met-
alinguistic and descriptive negations in prosodically different ways.
The perception experiment confirmed this, in the sense that hear-
ers were quite capable of predicting whether the word ‘no’ signalled
a problem or not (i.e., whether it was used metalinguistically or de-
scriptively). They could do this with utterances which display only a
small subset of the relevant prosodic features, and without contextual
or lexical information. These findings are interesting from a semantic
point of view: they give people who assume that negation is ambiguous
(be it semantic or pragmatic) an empirical argument for postulating
such an ambiguity. It has been noted that other constructions (such
as conditionals, questions, etc.) can also be used metalinguistically.
Consider the following examples (from Beaver 1997 and Horn 1985,
respectively):
(12) a. If Mary knows that Bill is happy, then I’m a Dutchman — she
merely believes it.
b. You did what with Sally and Billy?
We conjecture that some of the intonative properties which distinguish
metalinguistic from descriptive negation can also be found in other
metalinguistic phenomena.
The relation between meaning and intonation is a highly complex
one. We have argued that to investigate this relation an experimental
approach is called for, in particular one in which both the speaker’s
perspective and the hearer’s perspective are taken into account. One
obvious methodological advantage of doing experiments with different
speakers and listeners is that one gains insight into inter- and intra-
subject agreement, both in terms of production and perception, and
that it provides a handle on how to deal with the intrinsic variability
between subjects regarding intonational matters. In addition, it is in-
strumental in determining what is essential (that which many subjects
agree on) and what is peripheral (those features regarding which there
is little consensus). It is difficult to imagine how this distinction can be
made on the basis of researchers’ intuitions alone. It should be pointed
out that this methodological approach combining production and per-
ception studies is very general. For instance, we have also applied it
to the study of differences in accent types (Krahmer and Swerts 2001)
and in a cross-linguistic study of focus (Swerts et al., 2002).
The motivation for looking both at speakers and listeners is that it
does justice to our belief that a feature can only be communicatively
relevant if it is not only encoded in the speech signal by a speaker,
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but can also be interpreted by a listener. There is an interesting paral-
lel with Optimality Theory (ot) here; ot syntacticians tend to focus
on the speaker perspective, while ot semanticists (such as Hendriks
and de Hoop 2001) tend to focus on the hearer. Recently, there has
been an increased interest in combining the two perspectives (see e.g.,
Beaver 2004 for such a plea). In fact, we believe that an ot-like frame-
work is eminently suitable to model the intricate relationship between
intonation and meaning.
First of all, it is clear that whatever meaning intonational contours
may have, they can easily be ‘overruled’ by features from other lin-
guistic levels or by the situational context. This has, for instance, been
illustrated by Geluykens (1987) who showed that the classification of
intonation contours as statements or questions is influenced to a high
extent by the lexical content of the utterances on which they occur.
(13) a. You feel ill.
b I feel ill.
He tested this perceptually using sentences with a declarative syntax,
finding that high-ending contours are more likely to trigger an inter-
rogative interpretation if they occur on question-prone utterances like
(13.a) than on statement-prone utterances like (13.b). This difference
can be explained by the observation that it is easier to make statements
about one’s own internal state than about those of other people.11 Or
consider an utterance like
(14) You fucking idiot.
spoken to the driver of a car that just hit the speaker’s car. Whatever
contour the speaker would put on that utterance, it will be difficult
to seriously affect its intended basic meaning. In this paper, we have
seen that user responses to communication problems contain prosodic
but also non-prosodic cues, like the lexical material in the stuff part of
the no+stuff utterances. These cues may even conflict, as shown by the
particular example of the single metalinguistic negation consistently
classified as a descriptive negation (see Table IV); even though the
prosodic features of “no” suggested that there were no communication
problems, this is overruled by the lexical material in the stuff (“not to
Amsterdam, to Opdam!”).12
11 See e.g., Beun (1990) for an alternative analysis in terms of shared knowledge
and Safarova and Swerts (2004) for further discussion.
12 An open research question related to this would be how non-categorical features
can be integrated in an ot approach. In principle ot constraints are universal re-
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Note that for an ot approach which has something interesting to
say about the relation between intonation and meaning, it is essential
to integrate different levels of linguistic analysis into a single tableau.
A plea for such an integrated approach can also be found, albeit for
different reasons, in Beaver (2004), who notes that one of the main
advantages of ot is that it provides us with a new way of looking
at the syntax-semantics-pragmatics interface and enables us to make
the interconnections between these components explicit using relational
constraints.
A final interesting aspect of ot is that it offers a handle on in-
tonational variation across languages. The idea is that many of the
ot constraints are universal, although the ranking may differ across
languages. We conjecture that the usage of marked prosodic features
to signal communication problems is a universal phenomenon. Similar
effects have been found in quite different types of human-human and
human-machine interactions, collected for Japanese (Shimojima et al.,
2002) and American English (Swerts et al., 2000).
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